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I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Bocconi University, an Affiliate Fellow at the Stigler Center at Chicago Booth, and a research fellow at the BAFFI Center and the Dondena Center at Bocconi University. I also co-organize the annual Bocconi–Columbia Conference in Political Science and Political Economy.

My research uses game theory, experimental and statistical methods to study political institutions and behavior. Substantively, I focus on political parties and electoral competition, intra-party factions and candidate selection, and policymaking and accountability.

Research

peer-reviewed publications

“Learning in a Complex World: How Multidimensionality Affects Policymaking”. Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Political Science. With Federica Izzo and Jesse Crosson.  [paper]

Contemporary governments face a multitude of policy challenges. Choosing which issues to prioritize or leave unaddressed, and how to align their programs on different (and often connected) dimensions, present critical challenges for reelection-seeking policymakers. We develop an accountability model to study these decisions. We find that trailing incumbents embrace comprehensive policy programs, while leading ones prioritize fewer, independent policies. Our central result identifies a substitution effect among correlated dimensions: policymakers shift towards extreme or moderate positions when expanding their policy agenda, depending on their electoral prospects. This result generates novel empirical implications about the relationship between issue salience, policy extremism, and the incumbent’s electoral prospects, for which we provide a preliminary empirical test using data from the US.

“Bending the Iron Law”. With Carlo Prato. American Journal of Political Science, 2025. [paper][paper ungated]

We study the internal organization of political parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party principal (or selectorate) and two factions. Factional mobilization effort bolsters a party’s electoral chances but can only be imperfectly monitored—via an internal contest. We model a party’s internal organization as a system of “prizes,” an allocation of resources between winner and loser of the internal contest. We show that when (i) a party’s baseline electoral strength is low and (ii) electoral outcomes are not too responsive to mobilization efforts, there is an inverse relationship between inter-party power sharing and intra-party power sharing: institutional settings that award more resources and policy influence to election winners should produce party structures that promote a more egalitarian allocation of power across factions. Our results help organize the empirically documented dispersion in party organizational structures.

“Why do Parties Merge? Electoral Volatility and Long-Term Coalitions”. Journal of Politics, 2024. [paper] [paper ungated]

What brings competing parties to coalesce into new entities? I present a model of electoral competition in which parties can form alliances and decide how binding these should be. Parties face a dynamic trade-off between insuring themselves against significant shifts in public opinion and allowing flexibility to respond to future electoral changes. The model shows that more binding alliances such as mergers emerge in equilibrium when electoral volatility is high; instead, when voters are predictable (e.g., highly partisan), parties either run alone or form more flexible pre-electoral coalitions. When the electorate is sufficiently volatile, a risk-averse centrist party might prefer to merge with an ideologically extreme party than with a moderate one.

“Politics by Denunciation”. First author, with Andrea Ceron. Electoral Studies, 2023. [paper]

Judicial investigations into politicians are a fundamental component of politics, with these investigations often leading to public scandals. Yet, empirical evidence of the strategic determinants of judicial investigations is intrinsically hard to gather, a problem that has significantly limited the study of this important phenomenon. This paper studies the politics behind judicial investigations by leveraging new data on prosecutors’ informants in 1125 episodes of misbehavior of Italian MPs involved in different crimes (1983-2019). Results provide evidence in favor of a political use of denunciations for corruption crimes: when a party weakens, the likelihood that political enemies denounce past misbehavior of members of the weakened party increases, suggesting that the political use of denunciation is elastic to changes in the electoral performance. Furthermore, weakened MPs are more likely to be accused of misbehavior that happened a long time before the accusation, which further supports the argument that accusations are politically motivated.

“Institutions and Political Restraint”. With Michael Ting. American Journal of Political Science, 2023. [paper]

Recent political developments worldwide have focused attention on the fraying of political norms, often understood as informal restraints on opportunistic behavior. This paper presents a theory of political norms that incorporates both ideology and institutional structure. In the model, an election determines which party holds office in each period over an infinite horizon. Each period presents the majority party with an opportunity to modify a status quo policy. However, informal norms and formal institutional barriers limit its ability to do so by providing soft and hard constraints to policymaking, respectively. We show that political cooperation can be easier to sustain in political systems with fewer checks and balances. Under optimal norms, increasing ideological polarization makes norms easier to uphold, while also reducing welfare. Finally, norms maintained by minority parties are less sustainable, and voter optimal norms require minority concessions to achieve greater electoral competitiveness.

“Antagonistic Cooperation: Factional Competition in the Shadow of Elections”. American Journal of Political Science, 2022. [paper][paper ungated]

Intra-party competition is widespread and affects political parties’ strength. This paper presents a model of elections in which intra-party factions can devote resources to campaigning for the party or undermining competing factions to obtain more power. The model shows that inter- and intra-party competition are substitutes: Internal competition increases when the electoral stakes are low — e.g., in consensus democracies granting power to the losing party — because the incentives to focus on the fight for internal power increase. Similarly, an increase in party polarization incentivizes factions to campaign to avoid a more costly electoral loss. Factions in the moderate party campaign more than those in the extreme party; conversely, when factions in the same party are ideologically divided, extreme factions campaign more. Finally, the model studies how internal rules affect intra-party competition, showing how parties design internal contests among factions to maximize campaigning.

“Trust Nobody: How Voters React to Conspiracy Theories”. With Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2022. [paper] [pre-analysis plan]

How does exposure to conspiracy theories affect voters’ political attitudes and evaluations? Using an online experiment among US subjects, we show that exposure to conspiracy theories decreases voters’ trust in political institutions, such as mainstream parties and courts, as well as information providers. Subjects were exposed to conspiracy theories that are entirely unrelated to American domestic politics, which further underscores such narratives’ danger. However, results suggest that voters do not weigh unrelated conspiracies in their evaluation of politicians’ performance. Overall, our findings illustrate that an informational environment permeated by conspiracy theories could impede the functioning of democracy by eroding trust in its institutions, but that voters’ capacity to keep politicians accountable is resilient to unrelated information.

“Tra i Leoni: Revealing the Preferences Behind a Superstition”. First author, with J.B. Miller, T. Coen, M. Dufwenberg and L. Oliveira. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2021. [paper]

We investigate a superstition for which adherence is nearly universal. Using a combination of field interventions and a lab-style value elicitation, we investigate the strength of peoples’ underlying preferences, and to what extent their behavior is driven by social conformity rather than the superstition itself. Our findings indicate that both mechanisms influence behavior. While a substantial number of people are willing to incur a relatively high individual cost in order to adhere to the superstition, for many, adherence is contingent on the behavior of others. Our findings suggest that it is the conforming nature of the majority that sustains the false beliefs of the minority.

“Public Information: Relevance or Salience?”. Games, 2020. [paper]

How does salient public information affect voters’ behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses: subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information’s accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent: subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.

WORKING PAPERS

“Governing Through Division”. Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. With Federico Trombetta. [paper] 

We study how party factionalization affects policy-making. We develop an accountability model where the incumbent party leader can implement reforms but faces internal factions that can reduce reform effectiveness through dissent. The leader is aligned with voter preferences, while factions have competing policy goals but share the leader’s re-election objectives. Voters are uncertain about whether a reform is needed and how divided the party is, and value strong leaders who can effectively implement reforms. In equilibrium, dissent creates the informational environment that facilitates over-reform: precisely because they can overcome factional resistance, strong leaders reform even when maintaining the status quo would be optimal. In turn, strong factionalization can improve policymaking by removing the temptation to over-reform: weak leaders behave well not despite their weakness, but because of it. The welfare effects are non-monotonic: intermediate factionalization optimally balances the trade-off between reform effectiveness and equilibrium incentives to choose the correct policy. We also show that active dissent can yield higher voter welfare than strategic silence by factions.

“Party Factions and Candidate Selection”. Under Review. With Christine Bangum, Jon H. Fiva, Carlo Prato and Janne Tukiainen. [paper]

We study how parties share power internally by analyzing the allocation of list positions to different factions. We develop a theory of intraparty bargaining in which list positions shape the mobilization efforts of party activists in different factions. Our results allow us to link observable patterns in list allocations to the importance of consensus in intraparty negotiations. We empirically evaluate these predictions using data from Norwegian municipal elections. We exploit a wave of municipal mergers to identify candidates’ geography-based factional affiliations. In line with our theory’s functionalist logic and consensus-based bargaining, smaller factions are over-compensated in safe list positions.
While we also find a slight over-representation in the contested ranks, the relationship between size and resources is much closer to proportionality, as predicted by our theory.

“Should I Stay or Should I Go? A Theory of Factional Splits and Party Evolution”. With Federica Izzo.

Party systems frequently experience fragmentation through factional splits, often followed by mergers. While some splits are driven by anticipated gains in autonomous influence, others are expected to be costly. We develop a dynamic theory of intra-party bargaining that explains such damaging splits. In our model, factions may initiate damaging splits today precisely because they anticipate reuniting tomorrow. These splits can take systematically different forms. Some are unilateral: a faction accepts short-run losses to improve its relative position and secure greater influence when the party re-forms. Others are consensual: factions forgo the short-run efficiency gains of unity because temporary separation helps the camp reach new voters and strengthens it in the long run. These dynamics overturn standard intuitions: electoral systems that reward larger parties and egalitarian internal rules—typically thought to promote unity—can instead encourage fragmentation.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Protect the Brand”. With Livio Di Lonardo and Scott Tyson.

This paper develops a formal model of electoral competition to explain why candidates from historically marginalized groups often struggle to secure consistent support from their own communities. We propose a novel strategic mechanism called “protecting the brand,” which emerges from an asymmetric information structure: while majority candidates’ quality is commonly observed, minority candidates come from a newer political pool, creating uncertainty. Minority voters observe candidate quality directly, but majority voters must rely on signals from minority voting patterns to form beliefs about the overall quality of the minority candidate pool. We show that this information structure incentivizes minority voters to withhold support from lower-quality minority candidates, even when these candidates would provide higher utility than majority alternatives. This strategic behavior stems from minority voters’ desire to maintain a positive reputation for the pool of minority candidates. The model generates testable implications that distinguish our mechanism from alternative explanations based on unconscious bias or traditional discrimination, contributing to our understanding of representation and political selection.

“Accountability Among Allies: Intra-Party Competition and the Electoral Cost of Scandal”. With Stefano Sangiovanni and Andrea Ceron.

When do voters electorally punish political scandal? We argue that a scandal changes votes only when it can tip voters who are near indifference between candidates, and that intra-party contests place far more voters in that position than inter-party contests. A simple model of electoral sanctioning shows that this amplification appears even when both candidates belong to the party a voter opposes.  A pre-registered conjoint experiment on 3000 U.S. adults shows that the vote penalty for scandal is about 56.7% larger in intra-party contests, and the amplification also appears when both candidates come from the party the voter opposes. Inter-party choice settings may therefore understate how strongly voters punish misconduct when credible co-partisan alternatives are available.

Other Writings

“Inside Political Parties: Factions, Party Organization and Electoral Competition”.  [download dissertation]

“Political Scandals”. [paper]

This literature review is the first attempt to gather the existing knowledge we have about political scandals. It is motivated by the widespread occurrences and the rising importance of scandals in shaping political events, and the corresponding (surprising) lack of attention by the academic community. While there is little empirical evidence of how scandals affect voters’ behavior, we lack a theoretical systematization of the phenomenon. This review therefore has two main contributions: first, it provides a broad overview of the political science literature that has been treating scandals. Secondly, it imparts a formal framework to think about scandals that might be useful in guiding future empirical and theoretical work.

Teaching

APSA Formal Theory Section Teaching Resources
[Link to google drive folder]

Graduate level

Political Science Field Survey (Bocconi)
Core field survey in political science for the Social and Political Science Phd program.

Core Seminar in Political Institutions (Duke)
[Syllabus]
Core graduate seminar for the Political Institutions field in Political Science.

Comparative Political Institutions (Bocconi)
[Syllabus]
An in-depth overview of the state of the art in comparative politics. Special attention is given to
institutions and their relationship to development outcomes and paths to democratization.

Political Science Ph.D Math Camp (Columbia) 
A review of basic calculus and linear algebra, as well as an introduction to fundamental notions of real analysis used in graduate courses in quantitative and formal methods.

Undergraduate level

Introduction to Comparative Politics (Bocconi)
[Syllabus]

Political Parties and Electoral Systems (Bocconi)
[Syllabus]

CV

appointments

Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.
Assistant Professor, 2024-present.

BAFFI-CAREFIN Centre, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.
Research Affiliate, Institutions and Reforms Unit, 2021-present.

DONDENA, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.
Research Affiliate, 2026-present.

Stigler Center, Chicago Booth, Chicago, USA.
Fellow, 2025-present.

EDUCATION

Columbia University, New York, NY.
Ph.D. in Political Science, 2021.
M.Phil. in Political Science, 2017.
M.A. in Political Science, 2016.

Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.
M.S. Summa Cum Laude, Economics and Social Sciences, March 2015.
B.A., Economics and Social Sciences, 2012.

Download my cv here